Abstract. The objective of this paper is to investigate whether mergers create value for shareholders in both the short and long term. For this purpose, 120 announcements of mergers that were registered in Italy during the period 1994-2006 among listed companies were examined. The short-term analysis was conducted using the event study methodology in order to estimate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the time window around the announcement date (-10, +10). In this work, the sample of 120 mergers was divided into two sub-samples: the first considers the mergers that were carried out in all sectors of the economy, and the second focuses only on bank mergers. From the results obtained it would appear that, while the sub-sample of all mergers registered a statistically significant value creation for the shareholders of both the bidder and target companies, values also confirmed by combined analysis, the second sub-sample registered negative values for bidder companies and positive values for target companies. Negative values also seem to be confirmed by the results of the combined analysis both at the date of announcement and throughout the entire period of observation. For the long-term analysis the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns methodology (BHARs) was used, with which it was possible to observe the returns for three years. In the 36months following the merger, the portfolio showed a significant destruction of value.
Introduction
In Italy the market for Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) has shown an upward trend during the nineties, continuing more slowly during the last decade. In particular, there has been significant trend during the time period1994-2000 and another more restrained trend in the period2001-2006.In the period understudies, a "liveliness" was detected in the banking sector in the midst of reorganization process which began in the early nineties. From 1994 to2006, the value of M&A shares varied from 20,000million to140 billion Euros in1999.From2000 to 2006 it rose from129 billion to 100billion Euros(KPMG, Annual report).The average value of transactions stood between 30 and260 million Euros in the period examined. The market value of the targets amounted to208, 068 million Euros and that of thebiddersaround467, 484 million Euros. The relative size assumed values of44.51% (Table 1) . The market value of the bank targets stood atover53, 000 million Euros and that of the bidder's at251, 714 million Euros, for a relative size equal to21.26%. Note. Sixteen announcements were subtracted from the 120 initial announcements because of a lack of data. The Market Value of Bidder and Target refer to the last year prior to the merger announcement. MV is the overall Market Value.
On average, the total value of the companies involved in the merger process has affected 9.89%of the total market value. In the period 1994-2006 their weight was equal to 10.49%of the total capitalization of the Italian stock market and the highest value was recorded in 2001 and 2002 with a number of transactions equal to 10 and16 and an average of 8.TheMVaverageofbiddersandtargetsamountedaround35,960and16,005 million Euros, respectively. During the reporting period, average (9.89%) and median (9.48%) took on very similar values. The objective of this work is to investigate the value created (or destroyed) by the merger transactions in both the short and long term. In particular, starting from 120 merger announcements registered during the period 1994-2006, the equity performance of bidders and targets were investigated in the period around the announcement date of the deal. The total sample was divided into two subsamples(banking and non-banking), which were examined during the20 days around the announcement date with the event study methodology for the short term and the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns methodology (BHARs) for the long term. The post-merger performance of 40bidderswas observed in the three years following the merger. The short-term results indicate a destruction of value for the bidders of the banking sector and statistically significant and positive cumulative abnormal returns for the targets. The non-banking sample, on the contrary, shows significant value creation for shareholders of both bidder and target companies.
The long-term analysis, however, shows a high and statistically significant destruction of value for both samples, and the tendency of the portfolio of non-banking bidders to increase losses compared to the banking portfolio.
Literature review
M&As are one of the most explored areas of research. The majority of empirical studies examine M&A together, with no differentiation between the two types of transactions. The results found do not allow to come to a clear conclusion 1 Asquith, Bruner, &Mullins (1983) , which found abnormal positive values for both bidder and target companies in the month from the date of announcement of the mergers. Dodd(1980) instead examined a sample of151 merger proposals during the period1971-1977and found that at the announcement date the abnormal return for the target was more than 13%while for the bidder it was negative and equal to-1.09% 3 . Jensen &Ruback(1983)examined the results of several studies and concluded that the target companies recorded valuesof 20%, while the bidders accomplished zeroing the case of successful mergers. On the contrary, in the case of unsuccessful mergers, both companies registered negative values. Franks, Harris, &Titman (1991) and Serves (1991) found positive and statistically significant values for the target companies and negative values for the bidders. Healy, Palepu, &Ruback(1992) ,during the ten days around the announcement date in the period19791983mon a sample of50 large U.S. industrial mergers, found positive, high and statistically significant values for the target companies equal to +45.6% and negative but not significant values forth bidders(-2.2%). From the combined analysis they found positive and statistically significant values of +9.1%. Kohers&Kohers (2000) examined sample of1, 634mergers between high-tech companies in the period1987-1996and found positive and statistically significant values (+1.37%) for bidder companies between the announcement date and the day following the announcement, regardless of the method of payment of the merger. ) found a significant underperformance in the post-merger period. Malatesta (1983) , for example, after examining 336 mergers during the period 1969-1974, found negative and significant average abnormal returns (-5.4%) for acquiring companies in the six months following the public announcement of the merger, while during the same period the acquired companies experienced positive and significant abnormal returns equal to 7.0%. In the 12 months post-merger, considering the date of approval of the merger, the average abnormal returns were highly negative (-13.7%) and statistically significant. Franks & Harris (1989) , on a sample of more than 1,800 mergers in the UK in the period 1955-1985, found that the acquiring companies registered significant and negative abnormal returns (-12.6) in the two years following the completion of the merger. With regard to the banking sector next to the event study methodology, it is common to use the accounting approach and the analysis shifts to the observation of the evolution of fiscal indicators (ROE, ROA, operating income, cost/income ratio, etc.) monitoring them throughout the period before and after the transaction. For example, Berger, Demsetz, & Strahan (1999) considered the static and dynamic analysis of the effects of M&As. The case of economies of scale and scope of the transactions under consideration are the focus of static research, while the observation of accounting ratios, the search for efficiency and increased profitability achieved through cost reductions and/or revenue growth, are elements that characterize the dynamic analysis. Vander Vennet (2002) and Focarelli & Panetta (2003) found that the efficiency resulting from risk diversification can be achieved in the short term, while the benefits to be gained through economies of scope and cost reduction calls for a longer period of time to achieve them. Piloff (1996) examined 48 banks during the period 1982-1991, using both the first and second approach, and didn't find significant changes in performance in the two years following the merger. De Long (2003) investigated 54 bank mergers during the period 1991-1995 and found that the only variable that can explain the differences in long-term performance is the relative volatility of earnings. This shows that banks mergers get small benefits from the diversification strategy. Gupta &Misra(2007)examined 503 mergers during the period 1981-2004 in the three days around the announcement date and found significant losses for the bidder banks (CARs -1.84%) and significant and positive returns for the target banks (CAR +16.12%). In the long term they examined 214 transactions and in the following 24 months they found positive and significant values (BHAR +4.64%). More solid evidence to support the benefits of M&As can be found in the work of Haynes & Thompson (1999) who, after examining a sample of 93 British companies in the period 1981-1995, found significant and substantial returns in terms of efficiency in the five years after the event.
With regard to the event study methodology, the contributions of Neely (1987) (2000), Houston, James, &Ryngaert (2001) also found significantly negative and higher values for the bidders by examining the sub-period1985-1990. Conversely, the results that emerge from an examination of the M&Asin the European banking sector prove to be more fragmented. Cybo-Ottone&Murgia(2000), for example, investigated 54transactionsin the period1988-1997and foundsignificantly positive values for both bidders (CAR +2.19%) and targets (CAR +15.30%). Among the studies that examine M&As in Italy it is noted the work of Bigelli&Mengoli(1999)who, after examining the acquisition announcementsof56 listed companies in the period1989-1996, found valuesnot significantly different fromzero(CAR+ 0.48%) for the bidders in the thirty days around the announcement. Rossi (2005) studied12 eventsofM&Asinvolving29largeItalian companies during the period 1999-2003, and overall found results that were in line with other works: a loss of value for the bidders and an increase for the targets in the thirty days around the announcement. Unlike the bidders, however, on the day of the announcement the abnormal returns of the targets were significantly positive. (+2.86%) 5 . With reference to the Italian banking sector, some works dwell on the operational (or accounting) approach, and others on the event study approach and still others on both. Resti (1998), for example, found an improvement in the efficiency and productivity of merged banks compared to a similar sample that wasn't involved in M&As during the period 1988-1998. Resti & Siciliano (1999) restricted the analysis to a sample of acquisitions on 14 Italian banks (9 acquired and 5 buyers) in the period 1992-1997 and observed the behavior of the returns in three time windows, finding positive cumulative abnormal returns for both buyers and acquired companies, and for the latter even negative values in one of the three time windows. The two authors also proceed, through some fiscal indicators, with a check on the possible link between stock market performance and fundamentals and concluded that there is a weak correlation between CARs and fundamentals. 
Data and methodology
The sample examined was made up of 120 mergers transactions carried out during the period 19942006. Its construction required t e fulfilment of at least four requirements:
(a) knowledge of the announcement date of the merger 6 
and its retrieval through the database of Il Sole24
Ore, an Italian financial newspaper; (b) the presence of listed ordinary shares both for the bidder and target companies; (c) the continuous time series of prices of the ordinary shares which was acquired by DataStream; (d) The presence of significant number of bidders for t he whole period 1994-2006 8 . The data relating to the merger transactions were acquired by the 7 Commissioned National per le Societal e la Borsa (CONSOB) and from theBollettini di Vigilanza of Bankitalia. The abnormal returns in the short term were calculated using the market adjusted model (or index model) for the full sample 8 Assuming a "buy and hold "strategy for the entire event period. In order to investigate the market reaction to the announcement of the merger, two different time windows around the date of the event have been identified t (-10, +10)and t (-5, +5) as well as other asymmetric periods with respect to this date. In particular t (-1, 0) while the banking sector has also used the window t (-60, +60) e t (-30, +30) for the following period. Finally, to quantify the value created or destroyed by the transactions as a whole, the combined values of the ARs, and similarly of the CARs, were calculated using the following formula:
MVT,i Ai(=tR) AB,i(+tR) ATi((3) 6 The samplemade up ofbank shareswas also analyzedusing the methodofFama,Fisher, Jensen & Roll(1969) . The different methodslead tosimilar estimates (Brown & Warner, 1985) . 7 During the period of analysis two events were frequently registered: (a) that the bidders, in turn, became targets and were delisted; (b) that on the same day the bidders announced their merger with multiple targets. However, in view of 120 announcements it was not possible to examine a symmetric sample. The post-merger performances, however, were observed up to the delisting of the bidder. 8 The samplemade up ofbank shares was also analyzedusing the methodofFama,Fisher, Jensen & Roll(1969) . The different methodslead tosimilar estimates (Brown & Warner, 1985) . 9 The MIBTEL index isageneral basketwhich includes all the shares listed on theStock Exchange andhas been active sinceJanuary 3, 1994. It's avalue weightedindexthatis calculated everyminute during thecontinuous trading phaseon the basis ofprices.It is preferred touse this index, representative of allsecurities listed on theItalian stock market,because it is largerandcloser to the "market portfolio". It is important to note, finally, that in calculating the returns, allthe adjustments(dividends,stocksplits,etc.) have been taken into account.Hence the pricesfor both the securities and the basketare "Official Price" and "PriceIndex", respectively, andwere taken, as mentioned above, from Datastream. Currently it is no longer activeas it has been replaced by theFTSEItalyAllShare. 10 The sample ofbank mergerswas also observedin the time windowof120 daysaround theannouncement datebut usingdifferent time windowsincluding that of20 daysaround theannouncement date(-10, +10), through which it was possible tocomparethe results with thoseobtained from the sampleof total mergers. The decision toinvestigatethe bank sampleina longer time windowcomes from the factthat the procedure for bank mergersis more complexat the procedural level.
MVB,i+MVT,i MVB,i+MT,i where ARi (t), ARB,i (t), and ART,i (t)represent the abnormal returns at time t for the transaction i, MVB, and MVT,I
the capitalizations of the bidder and target companies, respectively of the last day of estimate.
To estimate the on-term abnormal returns the Buy and Hold Return methodology was used, suggested by Barber& Lyon (1997).
The returns of the sample firms were calculated as follows: Table 2 shows how the bank mergers registered negative valuesfor bidder companies and positive values forth targets. With the exception of the three days around the announcement date, the values of which are not significant, in the remaining cases the valuesare negative and statistically significant forth bidders, while for the target companies they are always positive and statistically significant.In a single sub-period, the bidder company recorded positive (0.81%) and statistically significant abnormal returns. The analysis of the combined valuesshowed in Table 3confirms the trend of negative abnormal values. With the exception of the window including the twenty days around the announcement date in which the valuesare close to zero and not statistically significant, in all the other intervals the mergers were destructive of value in line with the results produced from literature. The highest and statistically significant loss was recorded in the ten days following the date of the announcement (-3.01%). From the results shown in Table 4it is easy to notice that unlike the sample made up only of bank mergers, the sample which includes all mergers registered positive and statistically significant cumulative average abnormal returns throughout the period observed for both the bidders and the targets. The analysis of the combined valuesshown in Table5 confirms the trend towards creating value for the nonbanking sample. Within the twenty days around the announcement date, in fact, there was a statistically significant creation of value equal to 3.05%. 
Results and discussion

a. Long-term performance
Thelong-term resultsappear to conflict with short-term results in relation to thetotal sampleexamined. InTable 6, in fact, negative results emerge forboth portfoliosexamined. In the 36months following themerger, theportfoliosshowed asignificant destructionof value (BHAARsB-1.72% -24.64% BHAARsNB). In particular, thehighest and most significant losses were registered in thetwo yearsfollowing the mergerin the banking sector(BHAARsB-4.61%). The results found in this work are contrary to those of Gupta & Misra (2007) , who found positive and significant values (BHAR +4.64%). In a single sub-periodthebidders' stocksregisteredpositivebut not statisticallysignificant values in the order of1.35%.The portfolio ofnonbankingmergers, however, always registered negativeand statistically significantabnormal returnsand between the secondand thirdyear it registeredthe greatest losses(BHAARsNB-45.90%). For both samplesthere was a tendencyto increasethe lossesin the two yearsfollowing the merger withthe difference that whiletheportfolio ofbank mergerscontained thelossesafter two years, the non-banking portfolio registered the greatest part of the lossbetween the secondandthird year. The total returns of portfolio shown in Table 7confirm the results previously found. The highest and most statistically significant losses were recorded in the three years following the merger. In the following 36months theBHAARsTS amounted to-11.78%. This confirms the trend to increase the losses between the first and third year with the prevalence between the second and third year (BHAARs -19.90%). In nosub-period is there assign reversal in the values. The Figure 1 shows the trend for BHAARs following 36 months. Right from the startthe market perceives the merger as not generating value and maintains negative reaction for the following 36months. Apart from the portfolio of bank bidders which seems to show a zero trend with a substantial rise between the thirty-first and thirty-sixth month, the other portfolio assumes a persistent and consistent negative trend throughout the entire period. The total portfolio instead assumes an intermediate trend while showing a negative persistence.
Conclusion
A sample of 120 merger announcements was the subject of study in this work during the period 19942006 in the short and long term. In particular, two equally weighted portfolios composed of stocks of banking and nonbanking bidders were formed. In the short term the sample made up of banking stocks registered a significant loss for the bidder companies and positive and significant abnormal returns for the target companies. The portfolio consisting of non-banking securities, on the contrary, registered positive and statistically significant abnormal values for both the bidder and target companies.
The long-term analysis, however, showed that mergers do not create value, and that the portfolio of non-banking mergers tends to register greater significant losses than banking mergers. The trend is seen particularly between the second and third year where the abnormal returns are higher and more statistically significant in all periods examined. The banking portfolio shows a tendency to recover the returns between the second and third year, ending the period with a loss of -1.72%. Unlike the banking portfolio, the non-banking portfolio shows a tendency to increase the losses significantly between the second and third year, closing the observation period with a statistically significant loss (BHAARsNB -24.64%).
The examination of the total portfolio composed of two sub portfolios confirms a significant loss of value in the 36 months following the merger (BHAARsTS -11.78%).
In (c) the estimation models are inadequate to investigate this phenomenon and this explains the presence of abnormal returns. In this case, as Rau & Vermaelen (1998) pointed out, "Such tests should be used with caution" (p. 252). The fact remains that further investigations are needed to provide more solid explanations for the continual presence of this anomaly that exists regardless of (1) the country, (2) the sector of the economy, (3), the size of the samples examined, and (4) the time horizon observed.
